J. L. Gibson v. Utah State Teachers\u27 Retirement Board; Leroy E. Cowless; Charles H. Skidmore; Joseph Chez; Alex Jex; Milton B. Taylor; D. A. Wooton; and J. R. Smith : Petition for Rehearing, and Supporting Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
J. L. Gibson v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement
Board; Leroy E. Cowless; Charles H. Skidmore;
Joseph Chez; Alex Jex; Milton B. Taylor; D. A.
Wooton; and J. R. Smith : Petition for Rehearing,
and Supporting Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph Chez; Attorney General of Utah; Grover A. Giles; Asst. Attorney General of Utah; Wm. A.
Hilton; Special Counsel; Elias Hansen; Apearing as Amicus Curiae and on Behalf of Utah Education
Association; Attorneys for Defendants;
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, J. L. Gibson v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board et al, No. 6220 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/610
No. 6220 
In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
J. L. GIBSON, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U11AH ST.A.TE TE~~CHERS' RETIR~­~1ENT BOARD, LEROY E. CO\VLES, \ 
CHARLES H. SKIDMORE, JOSEPH ) 
CHEZ, ALEX JEX, ~IILT ON B. 
TA.YLOR, D. A. vYOOTTON, and J. R. 
S:M.ITH, Members Thereof, 
Defendants. 
Petition for Rehearing, and Support-
ing Brief 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of Utah. 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Asst. Attorney General of 
Utah. 
vnL A. HILTON, ~pecial Counsel. 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Appearing as Amicus Curiae 
and on Behalf of Utah 
Education Assolfl f J& ~~ .... \ 
to eyl , . !J.e .. n;tnts. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Assuming Language of Sec. 12, Ch. b3, Laws 
Ut2.h 1937, Uncertain and A1nbiguous, Still 
Construction Should Exclude Plaintiff 
from Membership in Retirement System .. 12-28 
Brief in Support of Petition . . . . . . . . . ....... 4-28 
Language of Statute Expressly Excludes 
Plaintiff, Etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 4-11 
Petition for Rehearing . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . ..... 1-3 
TABLE OF CITATIONS. 
Attorney General v. Parsell, 100 Mich. 170; 
58 N. w. 839 ......................... 6 
Board of Education of Ogden v. Hunter, 48 
Utah 373; 159 P. 1019 . . . . . . . . . ....... 22 
Buckl~ v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 
61 Utah 559; 216 P. 684 . . . . . . . . . ....... 22 
Cerfass v. State, 42 Md. 403. . . . ..... 6 
Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507.' ................ 6 
Cousins v. So:vereign Camp, (Texas), 35 
s. w. (2d) 696 ....................... 25 
(Table Continued). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITATION~ 
(A Continuation) 
]"~itzpatrick v. Gebhart, 7 Kans. 35 .......... 5 
Forsyth v. Selma Min. Co., 58 Utah 142;· 
197 P. 586 .......................... 22 
Hanchett, et al v. Burbidge, et al, 59 Utah 
127; 202 P. 377 ...................... 6 
Higgins v. Rinker,. 47 Tex. 393; 39 Harv. 
L. Rev. 122 ......................... 25 
Holvering v. St .. Louis S. Ry. Co., 84 Fed. 
(2d) 857 •..... ~ ...................... 5 
In re Schenk's Estate, 53 Utah 381; 178 
P. 344. . . ........................... ,6 
Koch v. Bridge, 45 Miss. 247 .............. 6 
Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28; 9·5 P. 520 ..... 22 
McClnskie v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 601. 
. . • . . • • . . • . • • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . ..... 6 
Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55; 65 P. 534 . 
. . . . . " • . • • . • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 6 
Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158; . 75 P. 371. 
. . . . . . . . . .... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 11 
Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382; 59 P. 524 ..... 22 
People v. Commonwealth of Texas~ 95 N. Y. 
556. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
Reese v. Judges of District Court of Salt 
Lake County, 52 Utah 520; 175 P. 601. 
.................................... 6 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Earle, 50 Utah 
114; 167 P. 241. ..................... 11 
Roberts v. Cannon, 20 N. C. 398. . . . . . . . ..... 6 
Ruggels v. Ill., 108 U. S. 526. . . . . ..... 5 
R. S. U. 1933, 88-2-11, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 8 
R. S. U. 19~3, 88-2-12, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 8 
R. S. U. 19331 88-2-12, Subdivision (8) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 8-9-10 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 
Utah 548; 134 P. 560.. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 11 
Schultz v. Ohio County, 226 Ky. 633; 11 
s. w. (2d) 702 ....................... 25 
Section 12, Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 2-6-12-15 
Sol. Block & Griff v. Schwartz, 27 Utal 
387; 76 P. 22 ....................... 11 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. 
57 Utah 208; 193 P. 821 ................ 22 
State, ex rel Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 
72 P. 338 ........................... 11 
(Table Continued). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
(A Continuation) 
State v. Davis, 55 Utah 54; 184 P. 161. 
. . • . . . . . . • . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .... . 6 
State ex rel Gallacher v. Third Judicial 
Dist. Ct., 36 Utah 68; 104 P. 750. 
. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . ........ · • . . . . . ..... 6 
State v. Pay, 45 Utah 511; 146 P. 300 ........ 22 
Statutory Construction (1940 Edition), by 
Crawford, Chapter XXI, Page 365 ..... 25 
Subdivision 24, Section 1 of Chapter 85, 
Laws of Utah, 1937,. .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. 15 
Tribune Reporter Pub. Co. v. Homer, 51 
Utah 153; 169 P. 170 ................. 11 
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 
457; 59 P. 96 .· ....................... 22 
U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wall (U. S.) 395; 18 
L. Ed. 830 •.......................... 5 
U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 \Vheat CU. S.) 76 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
\Vater Commission v. Brewster, 42 N. J. 
125. . . . . .....•..................... 6 
\Vest Bovlston Mfg. Co. v. Board of Asses-
sors; 277 Mass. 180; 178 N. E. 531 ...... 25 
West et al v. Sun Cab Co., (Md.), 154 Atl. 
100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... 24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
~tate of Utah 
J. L. GIBSON, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
l?l,AH STATE TEACHERS' RETIRE- · 2\IEN~r BOARD, LEROY E. COvYLES, \ 
CHARLES H. SKIDMORE, JOSEPH ~ 
CHEZ, ALEX JEX, ~~[I L T 0 N B. 
TAYLOR, D. A. vVO. OTTON, and J. R. 
SMITH, Members Thereof, 
Defendants. 
I 
Petition for Rehearing, and Support-
ing Brief 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
ASSOCIATE .JUSTICES OF THE SUPREQVIE 
COURT OF UTAH: 
Come now the defendants in the above entitled cause 
and respectfully petition this Court for a rehear-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
ing in such cause for the following reasons and 
upon the following grounds: 
1. 
That the majority opinion is in error in holding 
that the defendants contended that the word "con-
tributes" should be construed as meaning "has con-
tributed.'' 
0 
... 
That the majority opinion heretofore rendered is 
in error by in effect holding that the language of 
subdivision B of Section 12 of Chapter 85, Laws of 
Utah, 1937, is uncertain and ambiguous and as such 
requires construction or interpretation. 
:t 
That the majority opinion is in error in holding 
that by the use of the word "contributes" the legis-
lature intended to mean ''is contributing.'' 
4~ 
That the majority opinion heretofore rendered in 
this cause is in error in not giving to the word ''con-
tributes'' its natural and ordinary meaning and in 
not giving it the same meaning that such word is 
given in Section 21 of Chapter 85. Laws of Utah, 
1937. 
5. 
That the majority opinion is in error by in effect 
substituting in the act the words "is contributing'' 
for the word ''contributes.'' 
6. 
That the majority opinion is in error in construing 
ihe language used in subdivision "b'' of Section 12, 
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937, to the effect that 
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plajntiff is not permanently excluded from rnember-
ship in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement 
System. 
\\IJlerefore, upon the grounds hereinbefore set torth, 
the defendants in this proceeding pray that a rehear-
ing and reconsideration of this cause should be had 
and that the decision of the majority of this Court 
should be revised and that this Court render a de-
~ision holding that the plaintiff herein is permanent-
ly disqualified from membership in the Utah State 
Teachers' Retirement System and not entitled to 
the benefits of an annuity contract under said 
system. 
Respectfully suomitted) 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
WM. A. HILTON. 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
Now comes Wm. A. Hilton and hereby certifies that 
he is attorney for the defendants in the above en-
titled cause. That he has thoroughly examined the 
opinions filed by the Justices in this cause, has con-
sidered the legal principles announced in the said 
opinions, and that in his opinion there is good rea-
son to pelieve, and he does believe that the judgment 
and decision made by a majority of the members of 
this Court is erroneous and that the cause o~u~ht to 
be reexamined and recom~iclered by this Court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23d day of 
October, 1940. 
V\71\L A. HILTON. 
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Brief tn Support of Petition for 
Rehearing 
This brief in support of a petition for rehearing is 
:filed on behalf of the defendants and also on behalf 
10f the Utah Education Association which, by leave 
of this Court, has permitted their counsel to join 
herein as amicus curiae. It is the contention of the 
defendants and the Utah Education Association> 
first: That the language contained in the act here 
brought in question is clear and unambiguous and 
hence not subject to construction or interpreta-
tion, and, second: Even if it be conceded that the 
act is subject to construction, still under well estab-
lished rules of construction the act should be con-
strued to exclude plaintiff from membership in the 
Utah State Teachers' Retirement System. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE HERE 
INVOLVED EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES THE 
PLAINTIFF FROl\1: :MEMBERSHIP IN 
THE TEACHERS' RETIREl\fENT SYSTE:M 
AND THEREFORE THE OPINION OF A 
~MAJORITY OF THIS COURT IS IN ERROR 
IN INTERPOLATING ""\VORDS INTO THArr 
STATUTE. 
On the bottom of page two of the typewritten opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Larsen s.ays: 
''The argument resolves itself as to whether 
the expression 'The State of Utah con-
tributes part of the premium' (italics 
added) is to be read as 'is contributing' or 
as 'has contributed' part of the premium. 
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Plaintiff contends for tht' fornwr construc-
tion and defendants contend for the latter 
one.'' 
~-\.t the outset the defendants disclain1 any inten-
tion of contending that the wo1 d '• contributes'' 
should be construed as meaning • · ha~ contributed.'' 
If there is any language in the brief heretofore filed 
which conyeys the idea that defendants claim that 
the words "has contributed'' should be substituted 
for the word ''contributes,'' we wish to correct any 
such impression conYeyed because in our view there 
is no occasion and the law does not permit the inter-
polation of the word ''has'' into the act or construe 
the word "contributes" as meaning "has contrib-
uted." It is a basic principle of law in this and 
other jurisdictions that if a statute is plain, certain 
and free from ambiguity, then and in such case the 
courts must give effect to the meaning of the lan-
guage used and may not resort to interpretation or 
construction. Stated conversely, it is when, and 
only when, a statute is ambiguous and its mean-
ing uncertain that resort may be had to rules of 
construction or interpretation in order to ascertain 
what the legislature meant. Such has been the hold-
ing of this Court and courts in other jutisdictions 
time and time again. A few of the many cases so 
holding will serve to jllustrate the rule: 
Holvering- v. St. Louis S. Ry. Co., 84 Fed. 
(2d) 857. 
People v. CnmmmYwealth of r:rrxas, ~)f) N. Y. 
556. 
F. ~. v. Hartw~n., 6 Wall ( U. S.) 395; 18 
L. Rrl. 830. 
U. S. v. ·wriltherger, 5 'Vheat (tT. S.) 76. 
Ruggels v. Ill., 108 U. S. 526. 
Fitzpatrick ,~. Gebhart, 7 Kans. 35. 
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McCluskie v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 601. 
Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507. 
(;erfass v. State, 42 1\ild. 403. 
Koch v. Bridge, 45 Miss. 247. 
Water Commission v. Brewster, 42 N. J. 
125. 
Reese v. Judges of District Court of Salt 
Lake County, 52 Utah 520; 175 P. 601. 
Hanchett, et al v. Burbidge, et al, 59 Utah 
127; 202 P. 377. 
State e~ rel Gallacher v. Third Judicial 
Dist. Ct., 36 Utah 68; 104 P. 750. 
In re Schenk's Estate, 53 Utah 381; l'i8 
P. 344. 
Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55; 65 P. 534. 
State v. Davis, 55 Utah 54; 184 P. 161. 
That such is the law is fundamental in our system 
o:f government. If the courts are permitted to 
ignore the expressed intention of the legislature, 
such action on the part of the courts constitutes an 
invasion of the provisions of the legislature and vio-
lates the tri-parted theory of our government. If 
that is permitted the legislature becomes a nonentity 
and the courts actually make the law. In order to 
keep the judicial branch of government from invad-
ing the province of the legislature the courts re-
sort to construction· only when it is necessary to 
ascertain the legislative intent, and even where a 
statute is ambiguous, considerable caution should 
he exercised by the court lest its opinion be sub· 
stituted for the intention of the legislature. 
Attorney General v. Parsell, 100 Mich. 170; 
58 N. W. 839. 
Roberts v. Cannon, 20 N. C. 398. 
The Iangua,ge of subdivision "b" of Section 12, 
Chapter 85, LR\VS of Utah, 1937, i~ plain, certain and 
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free from ambiguity. It is there provided that ''the 
following teachers shall be excluded fron1 1nen1ber~ 
f,hip in the -retirement system.'' 
"{b) Every teacher who is the holder of 
a retirement annuity contract with the 
'_1\~achers' Insurance & Annuity Association 
of America, or with any other private or~ 
ganization or c01npany in which the State 
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof, contrib-
utes part of the pren1ium under svid con-
tract, provided however_ that every such 
teacher upon ceasing to be a holder of such 
contract ~nd being o'therwise eli~ble t0 
membership in this system shall forthwith 
1:ecome a member of this system.'' 
As we read the opinion in the light of the admitted 
facts, the members of this Court are all agreed that 
plaintiff is the holder of a retirement annuity con-
tract with the Teachers' Insurance & A.nnuity As-
sociation of America. As to that being so the:ce 
can be no doubt. The mere fact that plaintiff has 
ceased to pay premiums. and that the University of 
Utah has, upon the request of plaintiff, ceased to 
pay part of the premium on plaintiff's contract, 
does not change the nature of the contract. Such 
failure to pay premiums has merely the p,ffect of 
reducing the amount of annuity to which plaintiff 
will be entitled upon r2tirement. It does not alter 
the fact that he is the holder of a retirement con-
tntct. Plaintiff makes no claim tn the contrary 
nor is there any controversy about the fact that the 
contributions made hy the University of Utah as a 
part of the premiums on M.r. Gibson's contract was 
a contribution made by the State of Utah or by one 
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of its subdivisions. According to the prevailing 
opinion of this Court the word ''contributes'' as 
used in the phrase ''in which the State of Utah or 
any subdivision thereof contributes part of the 
premium under said contract" is so uncertain or 
ambiguous as to permit of interpretation or con-
struction, and that the word ''contributes'' should 
be construed as meaning ''is contributing.'' We 
most earnestly urge that the word "contributes" 
may not be distorted into meaning "is contribut-
ing.'' 
R. S. U. 1933, 88-2-11, provides that : 
''Words. and phras.es are to be construed 
according to the context and the approved 
usage of the language; but technical words 
and phrases, and such others as have ac-
quired a peculiar and appropriate mean-
ing in law, or are defined by statute, are 
to be construed according to such peculiar 
and appropriate meaning or definition.'' 
R. S. U. 1933, 88-2-12, provides that: 
''In the construction of these statutes the 
following rules shall be observed, unless 
such construction would be inconsistent 
with the manifest intent of the legislature 
or repu~ant to the context of the statute.'' 
R. S. U. 1933~ 88-2-12, Subdivision (8) 
provides: 
''Words used in the present tense include 
t?u? future.'' 
When viewed in the light of the provisions of the 
statutes just quoted and the generally accepted 
rules of construction and interpretation of statutes, 
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the language just quoted is as clear and certain as 
it can be made. ~Ir. Gibson was the holder of are-
tirement annuity contract in which the University 
of Utah contributed part of the prenriums after the 
act took effect. 11he act provides that it shall take 
elfect upon approval. It was approved on March 
23, 1937. The University of Utah continued to pay 
a part of the premiums until December of 1937. 
Admittedly plaintiff's status as the holder of the 
contract did not terminate when he ceased to make 
payments on his contract and requested the Univer-
sity to do likewise. 
'\Yhile the verb ''contributes'' is in the present tense, 
it, under the provisions of 
R: S. U. 1933, 88-2-12, Subdivision 8, 
also means any contract upon which the University 
of Utah shall contribute a part of the pre1niums at 
any future time. That is, at any time after the act 
took effect. If the legislature had n1eant what the 
majority opinion indicates, it would have been very 
easy for it to have provided that teachers should 
he excluded from membership in the retirement 
system only during the time that the State of Utah 
or one of its ~ubdivisions was contributing a part 
of the premium on a retirement annuity contract 
held by such teacher; but it did not ao that. If the 
legislature had intended that the word '' contrib-
utes'' means ''is contributing'' it mm:;t hr- assnmecl 
that it would hm'<' 11sed that languag-r. 
Moreover, if the words ''is contributing'' should be 
substituted for the word "contributes" thB statute 
would be rendered ambiguous and uncertain. If 
tl10 phrase in which the State of Utah or any sub~ 
division thereof "is contributing" a part of the 
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premiums should be substituted for the language 
actually used, the question might then atise as to 
the time that is meant by the words '• is contribut-
ing." It may be argued with considerable logic 
that the substituted words may mean at the timr· 
the act took effect, or at some future time when 
the _State of Utah or one of its subdivisions should 
cease paying a part of the premiums. If the word~· 
"is contributing" are substituted in the act forth, 
word ''contributes'' there may he room for inter 
pretation or construction, but obviously a crJurt may 
not by construction or interpretation create an un 
certainty or ambiguity in a statute, otherwise clear 
and certain,, and then proceed to construe the stat-
ute thus rendered ambiguous and uncertain. Under 
the act as it is the word ''contributes'' me am~ at 
the present time, which under the provisions of 
R. S. U. 1933, 88-2-12, Subdivision 8, 
also means at any tim~ in the future. In light of 
the fact, as appears without dispute, that the Uni-
versity of Utah did contribute a part of thr. pre-
miums on Mr. Gibson's contract afte1· the act took 
effect, the language used clearly excludes 2.T r. Gib 
son from the right to membership in the State rc· 
tirement system. Nor does the provision thai 
''every such teacher upon ceasing to be a holder o: 
such contract and being otherwise eligible to mem~ 
bership in this system shall forthwith become a 
me1nber of the syste~~' aid Mr. Gibson. He at all 
times Rince the act was passed and at the present 
time is the holder of such a contract. If the legis-
lature had intended what the prevailing opinion in 
effect says it intended, it would have been a simple 
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matter to have provided that when a teacher ceased 
to pay premiums on an annuity contract such 
teacher becomes a member of the system. It must 
be assumed that the legislature was fan1iliar with the 
fact that some of the teachers of Utah held contracts 
such as that held by the plaintiff; that such P-OD· 
tracts were not assignable, and also that even 
though perchance some teachers should temporar-
ily or permanently cease to pay premiums on their 
annuity contracts, the contract would still be in 
effect and entitle the holder thereof to an annuity. 
To hold otherwise is to assume that the legislature 
was either ignorant of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the subject matter of the legislature 
or that it did not mean what it clearly expressed in 
the language used. In this eonnection it should be 
observed that this Court is not concerned with the 
wisdom or the lack of wisdom of the legislature 
in enacting the law in the form that it was enacted. 
That is a matter solely within the province of the 
law-making power, in the apsence of Constitutional 
objections. 
Sol. Block & Griff v. Schwartz, 27 Utat 
387; 76 P. 22. 
Rtate, ex rel Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120; 
72 P. 338. 
Na~h v. Clark~ ~7 Utah 158; 75 P. 371. 
Trihune Reporter Pub.· Co. v. :Homer, 51 
Utah 153; 169 P. 170. . 
Salt Lake Countv v. Salt Lake City, 42 
Utah 548; 134 P. 560. 
Rio G1:ande Lumber Co. v. Earle, 50 Utah 
114; 167 P. 241. 
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ASSU~IING THAT THE LANGUAGE 0]-, SEC-
TION 12 OF· CHAPTER 85, LAWS OF UTAH, 
1937, IS SO UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS 
AS TO PER~1IT OF OR REQUIRE CON-
STRUCTION, STILL A CONSTRUCTION 
SHOULD BE GIVEN EXCLUDING PLAIN-
TIFF FROJ\1 MEMBERSHIP IN THE RE-
TIREMENT SYSTEM. 
We are mindful that when the language of a statute 
is ambiguous or uncerfain. the courts resort to es-
tablished rules of construction for the purpose of 
ascertaining the legislative intent. In the quest for 
ascertaining such intent resort may he had not only 
to the language used in the act, but also to the pur-
pose or reason why the particular law was passed 
by the legislature. In seeking to ascertain the legis-
lative purpose the courts will resort to intrinsic 
evidence bearing on intent, that is, evidence found 
within the act; also to extrinsic evidence, such as 
evidence touching the circumstances existing at the 
time the law was enacted, the necessity for the law, 
the evils intended to be cured by it, the law prior 
to the enactment, and the consequences of adopt-
ing the construction urged. 
In the prevailing opinion it is said that 
"if defendants are correct in their inter-
pretation any teacher who has ever, while 
teaching in the State of Utah, been the 
holder of such an annuity contract could 
never become a member of the retirement 
svstem. This follows of necessity since, 
n~nder the terms of the contract, the holder 
thereof can never divest himself of the paid 
up deferred annuity ba~ed upon the amount 
1H' had paid, except hy retirement from 
teachjng and using it up a.s r6tirement hen-
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efits, which disqualifie-s hin1 for men1ber-
ship in the system.'' 
It is true that the plaintiff herein under the 
contract which he holds may not divest himself of 
being the holder of that contract unless for some 
reason the contract becomes a nullity, or it is so 
changed as to make it assignable. At all events 
the contract held by the plaintiff is of his own 
choosing. However, it does not follow that the hold-
ers of other annuity contracts may not become 
divested of any rig-ht in such contract because of 
failure to comply "·it.h the contract or for oiher rea-
~ons that may be provided for in the contract. It 
will be observed that thei statute covers not 
rmly such contracts as that held by the plaintiff, but 
by ''any other private organization or company in 
which the State of Utah or any subdivision thereof 
contributes a part of the premium.'' But it is 
proper to inquire why should the plaintiff or any 
teacher who continues to hold an annuity contract 
be permitted to abandon a contract in which the 
Stat~ of Utah or a subdivision thereof has paid a 
part of the premium. 
There are very good reasons why the holder of such 
a contract should not be permitted to abandon the 
same and shift over to another contract where the 
State is likewise required to pay part of the pre-
miums. It is self-evident that "when in 1905 An-
drew Carnegie establiBhed a trust fund of ten mil-
lion dollars as a foundation for the advancement of 
teachers to be administered for retirement aHow-
ances to teachers in universities, collegef1 and tech-
nical schools'' such fund was intended for and cal-
culated as an aid to such teachers as were qualified 
to partake of its benefits. It is also evident tha't 
when the University of Utah consented to pay a 
part of the premiums on plaintiff's policy the State 
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of Utah, through its University, in effect acquired 
an interest in that contract. rl1hat is to t:lay, if tho 
plaintiff it; perrnitted to abandon that contract and 
shift into the State retirement system, any and alJ 
future benefits that Mr. Gibson may acquire by 
reason of the endowment will be lost, and the 
amount so lost must be borne either by Mr. Gibson 
or the other teachers of the State, unless perchance 
the legislature makes up the amount of such loss 
by additional appropriations. 
If, as Mr. Gibson apparently believes, he will g-et 
more by becoming a member of the State system 
than he will by continuing to pay the premiums on 
his present contract the additional amount that 
' ~fr. Gib·son 'Will receive and also the loss incurred 
hy abandoning his present contract must be borne 
hy either his fellow teachers or by the taxpayers 
of the State, or both the other teachers and the tax-
payers. To conclude that the legislatun~ of Utnh 
by the act here brought in question intended to 
~~hift to the people of Utah, discouraging· the hold-
ers of contracts from accepting the benefits that 
will be derived from private trust funds, such as 
the Carnegie Foundation Fnnd, on to the taxpayers 
of Utah i; contrarv to all hu1nan experience; lf in-
deed such conclusi~n does not cast suspicion on the 
intelligence and integrity of the law-making power. 
Obviously, if there be a trus,t fund in whic~ teach-
ers may participat?, the legislature, in the mterest 
of the State, would be expected to do all within its 
power to see that the teachers take advantage ?f 
the benefits derived from such trust fund, or, 1f, 
as in the case of plaintiff, they had received Rome 
of the benefits of such a trust fund the legislature 
doubtless would enact such laws as will require or 
encourao-e them to continue to accept the benefits 
from th~ trust fund rather than cast additional 
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burdens on the people of Utah. It is self-evident 
that if Mr. Gibson and other te~chers sirnilarly sit-
uated shall abandon such contra.cts as tha.t now held 
by :Mr. Gibson and becmne n1embers of the State 
Teachers' Retirement System, any benefits that 
such teachers will be entitled to from the Carnegie 
Foundation Fund will~ lost to someone within the 
State of Utah. If not to ~Ir. Gibson, then to his 
fellow teachers or the people of the State. 
In this coimection it may be of aid to look at the 
history ol. this State touching the establishment of 
retirement funds. ·. It will be observed from the pre-
vailing opinion that the Carnegie· Foundation Fund 
was not. availa}~le .·to any teachers other than thos.e 
in universities, colleges and technical schools. So 
far as we are advised no such private trust fund 
has ever been established in Utah· for retirement 
allowances to teachers in our common and high 
Fchools. Prior to the enactment of 
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
. the Board of Education in Salt Lake, Ogden and 
Provo made provisions for the teachers within said 
cities to avail themselves of a growing demand to 
provide a retirement fund for such teachers. It 
was only in those cities where, at the time the act 
of 1937 was passed, the benefits of retirement con-
tracts were available to teachers in our common and 
high schools. The lnc.:l.l system defined in· 
Subdivision 24, Seetion 1 of Chapter 85, 
Laws of Utah, 1937, 
refers to the plan ·whereby the teachers in the schoo]R 
of Salt Lake., Ogden ,and Provo cou]d secure the 
benefits of a retirement allowance, annuity or pen-
Rion as defined in the act. The act here brought in 
· question was enacted primarily to enable teachers 
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who could not participate in any retirement plan to 
do s.o. 
That the legislature attempted to make the cost of 
this plan to the people of Utah as low as could be, 
may reasonably be assumed. It is also reasonable 
to assume that the legislature knew that a substan-
tial trust fund had already been created by Mr. 
Carnegie and that possibly other such funds would 
be created for a like purpose. So also is it apparJ 
ent that the legislature knew that the boards of edu-
cation of the cities of Salt Lake, Ogden and Provo 
had provided for a plan whereby the teachers of 
those cities could avail themselves of the retire-
ment benefits to be paid for in part by public funds. 
In order to accomplish the purposes intended by the 
act, the legislature wishes to discourage, and, so 
far as possible, prohibit teachers who held contracts 
with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity AssoCia-
tion of America, and other private organizations 
or companies, from ceasing to carry out any con· 
tracts which they might hold where the State of 
Utah or any subdivisions thereof contributed; hence 
the exclusion provided for in subdivision "b'• of 
Section 12 of those teachers who were participating 
and may continue to participate in the benefits of 
private trust funds. 
By subdivision '' d'' teachers ''"110 were members of 
local systems were excluded from the act unless, on 
or before December 31, 1937, they, by a written docu-
ment, elected to become members of the State re-
tirement system. Unlike the teachers who held con-
tracts which entitled them to participate in private 
endowment funds, as contemplated by subdivision 
"b " the teachers who fell under subdivision "d'' 
' were not participating in any private endowment 
fund but were. under theh· contracts. entitled to 
participate in the public funds created hy boards of 
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education in the cities n1entioned. There was thus 
no controlling reason why the teachers under the 
local system should not be pern1itted to shift to the 
State system because in either event the contribu-
tions made to their contract came from publio 
funds. 
If the teacher remained a 1nember of the local sys-
tem the school boards contributed towards the fund, 
whereas if they becan1e members of the State sys~ 
tern the State contributed to the fund. Not so how-
ever with those teachers who fell under subdivision 
• 'b'' of Section 12 of the act. As to those teachers, 
if they abandoned their contract it resulted in shift-
ing the burden carried by the foundation fund on to 
the public fnnds of the State of Utah. Hence the 
provision that so long as they remained the holde1 
of the contract in which the State of Utah or one of 
its s~bdivisions contributes a part of the premium 
they may not shift to the State system. !1oreover, 
if a teacher in the same class as the plaintiff once 
establishes his eligibility for membership in the 
Utah State Teachers' Retirement System there is 
no provision in the act whereby his eligibility shall 
terminate if he shall later decide to reinstate the 
contract upon which the University of Utah has paid 
a part of the premiums. If the construction placed 
upon the act by the prevailing opinion is adhered to 
plaintiff "Will receive the benefits from two retire-
ment funds in which the State of Utah has 
contributed. 
That the law-makin<.; power did not intenrl to thu~ 
bestow upon teachers the premiums paid in part 
with public funds on two retirement contracts, 
while denying the same privilege to other teachers, 
would seem self-evident. More as to that: If tha 
act in question be construed as held by the majority 
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opinion the plaintiff and other teachers similarly 
situated may continue to indefinitely shift their 
po~ition by being entitled to membership in the State 
~reachers' Retirement ~ystem for one month or 
more, and. then upon ~ dtange of mind return to the 
Teachers' Annuity & Insurance Association of 
America or some other private organization. The 
language used in the act clearly indicates that the 
legislature intended to prevent such confusion and 
favoritism. 
s~ction 13 of the act prm,jdes that ''any contrib-
uting member of a local system who is excluded 
from membership herein by the provisions of sub-
division '' d'' of Section 12, and who is otherwise 
eligible for such memb.ership may elec1 to become 
a member of the retirement system by a written 
document duly executed and filed with the retire-
ment board on or before December 31, 1937." Tt 
is not claimed that plaintiff was or is a member of 
any local system. The act defines a local system aR 
''any public teachers' r8tirffinen_t association orJ 
ganized and operated for the retirement of teachers 
of any public school under the provisions of any 
laws of this State.'' Thus the act expressly ex-
cludes teachers from membership in the State re· 
tirement svstem who are contrihuting- members of 
a local sy~tem; provided that they 'i:nay transfer 
their membership to the State teachers' retirement 
system in the event the teacher elects to become a 
l';f'mlwr of thP ~vp,tpm ~.;;: h-.-." the act nrovided. But 
as to teachers who hold contractR within the Teach· 
ers' Insurance & Annuity Association of America 
or with any other private organization or com-pany 
in which the State of Utah or any subdivh:ion there-
of contributes part of the premium, the election is, 
under the plain languag-e of the act, at all eventR 
made as ~· matter of law when the State or any of 
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its subdiYisions ''contribute'' a part of the premium 
under the contract. 
On pag~ three of the typewritten prevailing opinion 
it is said: 
'• This construction is further evid~nced by 
Section 21, dealing with 'termination of 
m~mbership, - withdrawals and deposits,' 
and providing that a member who dis-
continues a status requisite to membership, 
except by death or retirement, may with-
draw from the fund his accumulafed contri-
butions. He may again become a member 
with his old standing and rating upon ac-
quiring a teaching status for membership 
and redepositing in the fund the amount of 
his ·withdrawals.'' 
The language of Section 21 tou('hing withdrawals 
and redeposits of necessity applies only to teachers 
who occupy the status requisite to membership in 
the State retirement system. Obviously, if plain-
tiff if ineligible to membership in the State retire-
ment system because he is the holder of a contract 
with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity .A.ssocia· 
tion of America in which the University of Utah, 
nfter th r D ·.' fnnk rf:rp,"f. · rn11trilntfPrl c~ part of the 
premium} he could not occupy the status of mem-
bership in the State retirement syRtem. If plain~ 
tiff has not deposited any money in the State J:e-
tirement fund prr.Yidrd for in t11e act the1·e is no 
money for him to withdraw. That the provisions 
of the act with respect to withdrawa 1~ and re-
depm.:its do not ancl eannot apply to mone~~ paid by 
the plaintiff as premiums on his contract with the 
Teachers' Insnrance & Annuity Association of 
America is obvious because of the fact that the act 
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deals only with the State fund, and the further fact 
that the fund in the Teachers' Insunmce & Annu. 
ity Association of America is beyond the control of 
the legislature. 
Attention is also called in the prevailing opinion to 
this language found in Section 21 of the act: 
' 'For the purpose of this section, the holder 
of a retirement annuity contract with the 
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association 
of America or with any other private or-
ganization or company, in which the State 
of Utah or any subdivision thereof contrib-
utes part of the premium under saia con-
tract, shall be considered permanent sep-
aration from service in status requisite to 
rnembership herein.'' 
Commenting upon the provisions last quoted it is 
said in the prevailing opinion that: 
"It then provides that for the purpose of 
Section 21 only, that is, of terminating a 
membership which is in existence and allow-
ing withdrawals of accumulated contribu-
butions, the holding of a contract with a 
private retirement pension company, for 
which the State is contributing part of the 
premium, shall be considered terminating 
the status of membership. . . . " 
We most earnestly submit that the construction 
placed upon the langua.ge last quoted from the pre· 
vailing opinion does violence to the clear meaning 
of the language of the act. It will be noted that the 
prevailing opinion interpolates the word ''only." 
If the language just quoted from the act is given 
effect according to its clear meaning, namely, that 
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the holder of a contract such as that held by plain-
tiff is permanently separated from the State re-
tirement system, he is precluded from Inmubership 
in the State systenl and therefore precluded from 
making payments to the State fund. If no payments 
may be made there is nothing to withdraw and 
nothing to redeposit. So, likewise, if a holder of 
a contract such as that held by plaintiff·" shall be 
considered permanent separation from service in 
the status requisite to membership in the system'' 
as the legislature has prescribed, he, of necessity, 
is excluded from membership in the State retire ... 
ment system as provided in subdivision "b" of 
Section 12 of the act. To say that a teacher shal1 
be permanently separated from the system and at 
the same time be a member of that system presents 
an impossible situation. 
It is reasonable to assume that in the light of the 
language found in subsection "b" of Section 12 it 
was not necessary to repeat the same thought in 
Section 21, but the legislature wished to make it 
clear and certain that the holder of a contract such 
as that held by plaintiff should be excluded from 
membership in the system and of the right to make 
payment~, withdrawals and redeposits in the fund 
set up solely for members of the State system; and 
hence the provisions of Section 21 that the holders 
of such contracts as that held by :ola.intiff, shall, 
for the purpose of membership, payment, with~ 
drawal and redeposits "be considered permanent 
Reparation from service in status requisHe to mem-
bership in the systrm." If the plaintiff must, be-
causf\ of being a holder of the contract he holds, "be 
considered permanent separation" from the system, 
he could not withdraw his membership from a sys-
tem to which he never belonged; and likewise he 
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1nay not withdraw or redeposit money from a fund 
to which he has not contributed. 
In this connection the Court's attention is directed 
to the well established rule of construction that the 
provisions of a statute must, whenever possible, be 
harmonized and not be so construed that one pro-
vision is at war with another. 
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 
457; 59 P. 96. 
Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28; 95 P. 520. 
N elden v. Clark, 20 Utah 3H2; 59 P. 524. 
Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 
61 Utah 559; 216 P. 684. 
State v. Pay, 45 Utah 511; 146 P. 300. 
Board of Education of Ogden v. Hunter, 48 
Utah 373: 159 P. 1019. 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. 
57 Utah 208; 193 P. 821. 
Forsyth v. Selma Min. Co., 58 Utah 142; 
197 P. 586. 
It is further said in the prevailing opinion that: 
''This is further made clear hy the pro-
visions with respect to teachers holding 
membership in local rP-tirement systems. 
Rnch teachers can only draw from the State 
fund a pension or retirement benefit in pro-
portion to what his contributions to the 
State fund bear to what he would have paid 
had he not belonged to the local system, 
·where a subdivision of the State pays into 
the local fund, but. such deduction shall 
rn,lv "hf:\ made for the time such teacher was 
n member of both systems.'' 
The langua.ge referred to in that part of the opinion 
just quoted applies only to membership in local re-
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tirement systen1s which are under the control of the 
State legislature and the boards of education of 
the schools wherein such systems have been estab-
lished. There is no private fund in the local sys-
tems. The provisions referred to cannot possibly 
affect the Teachers t Insurance & .Annuity Associa-
tion of America or any other like org~anization. It 
is thus difficult to see how the provisions with re-
spect to local systems can be of any aid in constru-
ing the language dealing with such contracts as that 
held by the plaintiff herein. 
It is said in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Wolfe on the bottom of page four of the type-
written copy that: 
"I fear the ruling in the main o!pinion 
courts disaster for these reserves or at 
least tends towards that result.'' 
Further on in the opinion beginning at the end of 
the first line of paragraph 1 on page five of the 
dissenting opinion, it is said: 
''It may very well be that the legislature had 
before it the number of men connected with 
the University of Utah and the Agricultural 
College who had contracts with the associa-
tion and had data in respect to each of such 
cont.rar,t holders.'' 
On page six of the dissenting opinion Mr. Justice 
Wolfe points out the burden that would be cast 
upon the State in the event there were twenty teach-
ers in the universities in the same or a similar situa-
tion as is the plaintiff, with an average :-;ervice of 
twenty years, it would cost Fourteen Thousand Two 
Hundred Eighty ($14,280) Dollars per year to pay 
retirement benefits and if they live twenty years 
after retirement it would cost the State for such 
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benefits the sum of Two Hundred Eighty-five 
~Thousand Six Hundred ( $285,600) Dollar::;. It is 
indic:ated that the illustration may underestimate 
or overestimate the real situation, but that it gives 
the reader some idea of what the legislature sought 
to avoid, etc. 
While the courts are not in entire accord as to what 
evidence or information they may resort to in order 
to ascertain the legislative purpose, the better rea-
soned rases take the view that courts are not shut 
off from the discussion and sources of information 
that were available to the legislature that may shed 
light on the purpose sought to be accomplished by 
an enactment. 
West et al v. Sun Cab Co., (Md.), 154 Atl 
100. 
If the facts that were available and presumably 
known to the legislature at the time of the passage 
of the law here brought in question were judicially 
known to this Court, the fear entertained by Mr. 
Justice Wolfe would be more than justified and it 
would be made clear that the strain on the State 
fund would be very much greater than the amount 
used in the illustration by Associate Justice ·Wolfe. 
While there may be some doubt as to how this Court 
1nay judicially know the true state of facts tha.t were 
available to the legislature at the time the act was 
passed, such information should, in our view, be 
1nade available to this Court before the prevailing 
.opinion becomes the settle11aw in this ;jurisdiction. 
That it would be a very material aid to this Court 
in determining the legislative purpose and intent in 
passing the act here in question if it had before it 
the facts tha.t were available to the legislature when 
the act was passed, cannot admit of doubt. That 
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the Court may inform itself a8 to such circmnstances 
by any and all available n1ean8, finds support in 
the adjudicated cases. 
Schultz v. Ohio County, :226 Ky. 633; 11 
S. \Y. (2d) 702. 
Cousins v. 8overeign Can1p, (Texas), 35 
S. \Y. (2d) 696 
Higgins v. Rinker, -17 Tex. :~93; 39 HalT. 
L. Rev. 122. 
West Boylston Mfg. Co. v. ·Bvard of Asses~ 
sors, 277 ~lass. 180; 178 N. E. 531. 
That evidence may be introduced when a statute is 
uncertain and hence requires construction for thA 
purpose of shedding light on the legislative pur-
pose and hence legislative intent, finds support in 
both textbooks and adjudicated cases. A very re-
cent work containing a discussion of citations of 
authority of this matte~ will be found in 
Statutory Construction (1940 Edition), by 
Crawford, Chapter XXI, beginning on 
Page 36;). 
A resort to the information available to the lf>:gis-
lature when the act here brought in question was 
passed will show, among other pertinent facts, the 
following: That in excess of two hundred (200) 
teachers and agents were in the employ of the Uni-
versity of Utah and the Agricultural College who 
had contracts \Yith the Teachers' Insurance & An-
nnit~r Association; that if these teachers and agents. 
should become member~ of the Statr> system with-
out deduction because of their havin!! heen mem-
bers of the Teachers' Insurance & An~;n_ty Associa_ 
tion, it would require about One Hundred Forty 
Thousand ($140,000) Dollars a year, or, if they lived 
fifteen years after retirement, a probable total sum 
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of Two Million ( $2,000,000) Dollars to take care of 
retirement benefits. If a reduction is made because 
of teachers having been members of the association 
the cost of such retirement benefits would probably 
amount to Eighty-seven Thousand ($87,000) Dol-
lars per year, or if the teachers lived an average of 
fifteen years after retirement, the probable total 
cost would be One Million Three Hundred Ten 
Thousand ($1,310,000) Dollars. 
It should be observed that in referring to agents, 
s01ne of the faculty of the Agricultural College who 
were engaged in experimental work are eligible for 
and do hold contracts with the Teachers' Insurance 
& Annuity Association. It will thus be seen that if 
the majority opinion is to stand it may well beth~ 
death knell of the retirement system. If this Court 
~hould conclude that the foregoing facts are a. 
proper subject matter of inquiry in this case (and 
we believe them to be) we most earnestly urge that 
a rehearing be granted so that this Court may 
properly be advised with respect thereto. 
An examination of the entire act here brought in 
question shows that while teachers in local systems 
may become members of the State system, they may 
not receive the benefits of members in both systems. 
No such provision is made with respect to thosP. 
teachers who hold contracts with the Teachers' In-
surance "& Annuity Association, or other private 
organizations or companies to which the State sys· 
tern or a subdivision thereof pays a part of the pre-
mium. Membership in the State ~ystem carries 
with it benefits which all members thereof are en-
iitled to participate in without any provision what-
soever for a deduction because of a teacher being or 
having been the holder of a contract with the Teach-
ers' insurance & Annuity Associatio11. A definit.P-
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time is fixed by the act for n1embers of a local sys-
tem to become transferred to the State system. 
There is no such provision with respect to the holder 
of a contract with the Teachers Insurance & Annuity 
Association. All of these facts point unerringly to 
0 0 
the conclusion that the act was intended to exclude 
holders of contracts with the rreachers' Insurance 
& Annuity Association from membership in the 
State system. 
If the construction placed upon the act by the nlajor-
ity opinion is to prevail there is no language what-
soever in the act which precludes the plaintiff and 
::>ther holders of similar contracts from retaining 
all the benefits of a contract with the ~Peachers' In-
surance & Annuity Association and also all of thP 
benefits of the State system. Such result offends 
against fair and equal dealing towards all teachers. 
In the light of the fact that the act was passed pri-
marily to assist those teachers who were unable to 
secure the benefits of a retirement fund at the time 
the act was passed} it would indeed be a grave in-
justice to such teachers if other teachers in univer-
sities, colleges and technical schools, already taken 
care of by contracts to which the State has con-
tributed a part of the premium, should be vermitted 
to keep what they have without any deductions 
whatsoever and in addition thereto participate 
equally with other teachers who have not been so 
favored in a State fund, with the probable result 
that such fund will be destroyed, and with the cer-
tainty that it will h0 seriously impa.i.red. 
We earnestly urge that the language of the act 
clearly precludes such results and even if the lan-
guage be regarded as uncertain or ambiguous the 
eRtablished rules for construction and interpreta-
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tion of statutes require that such a result was a 
is contrary to the legislative intent. 
This proceeding is of vital concern to the teache 
and people generally of the State of Utah and 1 
earnestly urge that a rehearing should be grant~ 
to the end that this cause he reexamined and th 
the statute be held to exclude plaintiff from mez 
bership in the State system. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of Utah. 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Asst. Attorney General of 
Utah. 
IDI. A. HILTON, Special Counsel. 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Appearing as Amicus Curiae 
and on Behalf of Utah 
Education Association. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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